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AN AMERICAN WAY FORWARD?
Lind, Michael. The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2006. 259pp. $24

This is a finely composed and extremely
timely exposition on American grand
strategy. Michael Lind, former editor of
The National Interest and now a fellow
at the New America Foundation, lays
out an interesting thesis about a distinctly American strategic foundation.
Where the late Russell Weigley described the “American way of war” (The
American Way of War: A History of
United States Military Strategy and Policy, Indiana Univ. Press, 1977) as direct,
offensive, and absolute, Lind argues
that its strategic counterpart always
strives to retain a more delicate internal
balance. Operationally, the U.S. military seeks annihilation; strategically,
U.S. foreign policy avoids absolutism in
order to preserve a distinctly American
and limited conception of government.
The real purpose of American strategy,
according to this thesis, is the preservation of the American way of life by ensuring that the rise of a foreign hegemon
does not inadvertently corrupt or sacrifice
our own liberties at home. Lind argues
that this American way of life is founded
upon a constitutional order of checks and
balances, a free-market economy not
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unduly constrained by government’s
reach or interference, and a sacrosanct focus on individual freedoms. The author’s
worst nightmare is the rise of a foreign
opponent that would trigger an internal
reordering of American government that
undercut essential liberties and its carefully constructed institutions.
Such an idea would not have been foreign to the founding fathers. Benjamin
Franklin once noted that those who
would sacrifice a bit of liberty for more
security deserved neither. This antistatist perspective may also be seen in
Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg’s
well regarded book In the Shadow of the
Garrison State (2000). Friedberg demonstrates that U.S. Cold War success was
achieved by tapping into the creativity of
the American people and the vitality of
the American economy without creating
a state that arrogated too much authority or control. This antistatist preference
guided a series of U.S. administrations,
even as the Soviet Union’s power continued to grow. Instead of becoming a garrison state, the United States ultimately
outpaced its overly centralized and statist rival.
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Lind contrasts his definition of the
American creed—“republican liberalism”
—against a set of alternative futures.
These involve the rise of “Caesarism,”
the establishment of a garrison state,
subjugation to a tributary status, and
the emergence of a “castle society.” A
Caesarian tyranny would usurp individual freedoms, while the surrender of
American sovereignty would result
from either national defeat or intimidation. The garrison state would ultimately
absorb the freedoms and economic energy of the population; a castle society,
characterized as a country internally
wracked by anarchy and massive insecurity, would also extinguish personal
freedom.
In applying this American creed to contemporary challenges, Lind castigates
the neoconservative thrust of the past
few years, especially its focus on amassing military power and the extension of
U.S. hegemony. Rather than perpetual
military dominance, the author advocates a more prudent grand strategy
consistent with preserving the American way of life. Lind argues that the
United States should employ a “concert
of power” that would prevent any hostile state from dominating the three key
regions of the globe, “without requiring
the United States to seek to perpetually
control these areas alone.” Additionally,
instead of an “irrational” post–Cold
War strategy of isolation, the United
States should seek “a special relationship” with Russia. However, Lind never
addresses how such concerts and relationships might appear to China and
Russia, powers that have not fully accepted the existing international system; nor does his approach offer much
in terms of transnational threats.
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Overall, Lind finds much of value in
classical realism and state-based power
balances. This approach, eschewing as it
does crusades for democracy, may lack
a moral compass, but it has a growing
appeal, given the imbroglio we know as
the Middle East. Lind is aware that a
classical balancing approach does not
apply to every region of the world—for
example, in the Gulf region—but he
encourages the United States to keep a
lower profile, as an offshore balancer of
last resort—“the least bad of several bad
options.” Lind forcefully argues against
what he perceives as the goal of global
primacy that dominates current U.S.
strategy. Such an approach is at odds
with what Lind believes to be timetested American traditions: “When
American leaders have followed the
American way of strategy, they have led
the American republic from success to
success, and when they have deviated
from it the results have been disastrous.”
It is impossible not to find this book
relevant to the ongoing debates over
America’s strategy against global terror
and the domestic implications of that
strategy. Many have cautioned that we
now live in the shadow of a security
state. The advent of the Patriot Act,
extraordinary renditions, aggressive
surveillance protocols unchecked by judicial review, extended detentions without recourse to representation or due
process, and military tribunals all suggest that concerns about a security state
are well founded.
While its policy prescriptions are less
than satisfying, this is a relevant and
thoughtful book to be read and discussed by almost anyone involved in
international relations and the American national security establishment. It
could serve as a useful primer on
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American foreign policy, as well as a
cautionary tale on the dangers of trying
to achieve preeminence overseas at the
cost of undermining security at home.
The American Way of Strategy could
also inform today’s emerging maritime
strategy, for which its characterization
of the benefits of various grand strategies has value.
F. G. HOFFMAN

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia

Kagan, Frederick. Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy. New York:
Encounter Books, 2006. 432pp. $29.95

How has American military strategic
thought evolved since the fall of Saigon?
How did each service reinvent itself,
shake off old ghosts, and restore morale
and purpose? How did each decide
upon a different doctrine to guide its
training, procurement, and deployment? How much influence do civilian
defense officials wield over strategy and
doctrine? Is the country well served by
the process that produces strategy and
doctrine inside the services? Military
historian Fred Kagan provides here a
tremendous primer on these issues. He
has written a clear, definitive, and opinionated history of the development of
strategy and doctrine in the American
military since 1975. His clarity of prose
and the evenhandedness of his presentation enable the reader to separate the
history from Kagan’s interpretation.
That is the mark of a fine scholar.
Kagan is well known among military
historians. A serious researcher and author of a major work on the Napoleonic
wars, his greatest strength is his down-
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to-earth, friendly, inquisitive style. As
the resident military scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, Kagan
has the venue and cachet to draw ambassadors and four-star generals routinely to his conferences, where they
join captains and majors fresh from the
battlefield. Building upon his years as a
professor at West Point, Kagan has developed a broad network of military
contacts that makes this book a blend
of scholarship and insider knowledge.
Though he is plugged into the daily
skirmishes of Washington’s political
arena, as a historian Kagan’s chief interest lies not in the immediate issues but
in focusing upon the underlying trends.
The author blends brief synopses of
such past campaigns as Bosnia, DESERT
STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM with portraits of strategic iconoclasts like John
Boyd, John Warden, Douglas MacGregor,
and Arthur Cebrowski, emphasizing
how doctrine changed and with what
results related to budgets and force
structure. Kagan does not believe that
force structure evolves slowly over the
decades. Instead, he illustrates how the
few influence the many, and how strategic leadership affects the direction of
each service for good or ill.
On the positive side, Kagan recounts
how in 1978 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, came
to believe that the downward spiral in
the naval budget was the result of an intuitive strategy held by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his senior
staff. These civilian defense leaders were
concerned that the Soviet Union was
increasing its geopolitical pressure
across Europe, gaining both economic
and political advantage in the shadow
of its presumed superiority in land
forces. Accordingly, the Office of the
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